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ISLAND TRAJECTORIES 
Starting with Iceland in 1944, the emergence of many small sovereign island states has 
generated interest in the economic and political viability and vulnerability of small 
jurisdictions. This seemingly irresistible march to sovereignty proceeded for several 
decades after the Second World War, before waning considerably in recent years. 
Instead, many island jurisdictions today choose to operate as relatively autonomous 
units within a larger 'federal' framework encompassing larger states. Hence, recent 
island scholarship has taken a natural turn towards sub-national or non-sovereign 
jurisdictional powers and arrangements. 
Globalization too has ironically appeared to create perverse incentives for both 
political fragmentation and economic integration. One side of this dynamic has led to a 
'revolution in localism' (Bartmann, 2000: p. 52) unleashed in response to these 
simultaneous pressures. Three important trends facilitated this transition: (1) the 
advance of the principle of subsidiarity (which suggests that decisions are best made at 
the lowest appropriate level where these can be functional), combined with the 
championing of sustainable community-based decision-making (Wondolleck, 1985; 
Davos, 1998, van Hecke, 2003); (2) the proliferation of information and communication 
technologies (JeT) which facilitate social and economic networks that would otherwise 
be hard or impossible to establish; and (3) the coming into force of international laws, 
designations and agreements, agreed to by nation-states (and their regional units) which 
can therefore be used to the advantage of sub-national regions or groupings. 
In the context of islands, these three developments reinforce trends to decentralization 
of decision-making towards local governance, and to collaboration among islands 
seeking to influence policy or engage in cultural, social or economic exchange. ICT 
increasingly allows the social structures of islands - which transcend their physical 
boundaries (Pitt, 1985; Veronicos, 1987) - to be both strengthened and deepened, 
permitting access to a wider audience and to niche markets. As a result, SNlJs may now 
be better able to exploit international agreements entered into by the parent country, to 
use these for their own advantage, or even in certain circumstances, to circumvent them. 
CASE STUDIES 
The case studies selected for this comparative study of sub-national island 
jurisdictions (SNlJs), the Galapagos Islands and San Andres and Old Providence 
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(SAOP), are in many respects typical of islands around the world. Their respective 
economies, for example, are dominated by the primary and tertiary sector activities of 
fishing and tourism. 
Both islands experienced periods of rapid population growth and economic 
development. In SAOP this started in the 1950s while, in the Galapagos, rapid 
development started in the 1980s. In both island groups, the development process led 
directly to a re-evaluation of, and change in, their SNIJ status. The trend worked, 
however, in two opposite directions for our case studies. Development in SAOP led to 
a contraction in its local autonomy, as the parent state increased its influence on the 
islands, whereas in the Galapagos politically aware local groups, supported by a local 
and international scientific lobby, were able to exploit the island's international status 
to expand and strengthen its autonomy. This chapter explores the development 
process on each of these island territories and seeks to explain why each island has 
arrived at such different destinations and jurisdictional outcomes. The analysis will 
show that, despite the contemporary political climate favouring greater localism, 
effective autonomy and resource management may be held back by internal island 
conflicts. 
CASE STUDY 1: THE GALApAGOS 
The islands of the Galapagos lie some 1,000 km to the west of mainland Ecuador. 
Reaching an altitude of 1,700 m, the islands comprise the top of a volcanic outcrop 
rising from the ocean floor at a depth of 3,000 m. The archipelago is spread over 
45,600 km2 of sea, with a land area of 800 hectares. There are 13 larger islands and 
over 100 smaller islands and outcrops. The mixing of cold water from the south and 
warm equatorial waters makes the marine environment highly productive. Isolation 
resulted in limited colonization by animals and plants, permitting then a unique 
evolutionary path. This unique ecosystem drew pioneers like Charles Darwin to its 
shores, just as surely as it now draws a lucrative eco-tourism industry. 
Serious exploitation of the islands' resources first occurred in the nineteenth century 
with US and British whalers. In addition to whales, large numbers of tortoise were 
taken for food. The first animal introductions (rats and goats) occurred around this 
time. The introductions of new plants and animals continue to pose a major threat to 
indigenous flora and fauna. 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were failed attempts 
to establish settlements based on the exploitation of giant tortoise for tortoise oil, 
most notably by 2,000 Norwegians in 1929. Later the islands were used as a US 
military base during the Second World War, and as a penal colony on the island of 
Isabela between 1946 and 1959. 
The Galapagos is of course most famous because of its association with Charles 
Darwin (1809-82). It was partly as a consequence of Darwin's observations in the 
Galapagos that he developed his theory of evolution through natural selection. 
Darwin's theory irrevocably changed the discipline of biology and is now almost 
universally accepted within the scientific and wider community. But Darwin's impact 
goes far beyond that of narrow science. Darwin's ideas directly challenged the 
conventional teaching of the monotheistic religions that claimed the earth was 
created, by God, for the overriding purposes of humankind. In Darwin's world, 
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however, humankind was no longer separated from the natural world but was, in 
fact, an integral part of it. Without Darwin's vision, we would not have had the 
modern understanding and science of ecology. Possibly more importantly, Darwin's 
ideas helped change humankind's perception of itself and set in train a process 
whereby now much of humankind accepts a moral responsibility towards the earth 
and the environment. The evolution of environmental ethics builds on Darwin's view 
of the place of humans as integral parts of the natural world. 
For our purposes, however, the islands of the Galapagos archipelago have grown in 
status and stature, hand in hand with the rising reputation of Darwin. They occupy a 
place of importance not only in the history of science, but also in the popular 
imagination and culture of the wider global community. As we shall see, this niche of 
intellectual and political capital has provided an important resource for asserting 
claims for the autonomy and jurisdictional entitlements of the islands against 
mainland Ecuador, particularly in relation to resource management and protection of 
the island's environmental heritage. 
Population, migration and employment 
Emerging economic opportunities particularly in tourism on the islands have been a 
powerful draw for immigrants from mainland Ecuador. The population has increased 
steadily, from just 1,346 in 1950, to 15,311 in 1998 (Erikson and Ospina, 1998; 
Borja, 2000; INEC, 1998). Based on the 1990-98 growth rate, the estimated 
population in 2001 was 21,000. 
Ecuador is one of the poorest countries in South America with a GDP per capita of 
around US$2,000. In 1994, 35% of the population was living below the poverty line 
(World Bank, 2005). Per capita GDP is a good proxy for incomes, but of course tells 
us nothing about the distribution of that income. There are no official estimates of 
GDP in the Galapagos. However, a crude estimate, based only on tourism and fishing 
receipts, suggests a minimum GDP of around US$3,600 per head (based on year 2000 
data) (Kerr, 2005). Moreover, the islands perform better than the mainland on key 
quality-of-life indicators (such as literacy, sanitation or infant mortality) (INEC, 
1998; World Bank, 2005). The relative prosperity and better quality of life in the 
islands are an important attraction for potential migrants from the mainland. 
Governance 
The islands became part of the Republic of Ecuador in 1832. The Galapagos National 
Park was established in 1959. A marine protected area was declared in 1986, 
extending to 15 miles offshore. This was extended to 40 miles in 1998, as the 
Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR). The Special Law for the Conservation and 
Sustainable use of the Province of the Galapagos (SLG), which established the GMR, 
was declared in March 1998. The SLG and the governance of the GMR are 
particularly important because they regulate access to the islands' key economic 
resources. 
The SLG has delivered a heightened level of autonomy to the islands. This includes 
a restriction on immigration; the protection and confinement of fishing to locals using 
artisanal methods only, and restrictions on the number of tourist operators. 
Enforcement of the rules within the GMR is the responsibility of the Galapagos 
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National Park Service (GNPS). The SLG established two levels of decision-making 
bodies to manage the GMR: (1) an Authority for Inter-Institutional Management 
(AIM); and (2) a Participatory Management Board (PMB). AIM is the ultimate 
authority with responsibility for developing a management plan for the GMR. AIM 
members include four national government ministries (Tourism, Environment, 
Commerce and Fisheries and Defence) and three Galapagos-based groups (fishers, 
environmental group and tourism sector). Where necessary the AIM makes 
decisions by majority voting, thereby ensuring that in the event of conflict, the 
interests of mainlanders can outvote those of the Galapagos islanders. The PMB is 
formed by five local groups (Local Chamber of Tourism, fishers, the Charles 
Darwin Research Station (CDRS), the GNPS and nature guides). The PMB makes 
its recommendations to the AIM by consensus, providing stakeholder input into the 
establishment of each fishing season's catch quota and the regulation of tourist 
vessels. When consensus has been reached by the PMB, their proposals have 
generally been accepted by the AIM. However, when the PMB cannot reach 
consensus, AIM can take unilateral decisions, albeit within the general principles of 
the SLG, based on majority voting. As noted above, national rather than local 
bodies enjoy majority membership on the AIM. Under these circumstances, a failure 
to achieve consensus within the PMB can result in decisions made at the AIM that 
are driven essentially by off-island interests. 
Although the PMB is a consensus-based decision-making body, there are serious 
tensions within its membership. The fishers, for example, have openly questioned the 
legitimacy of the CDRS within the PMB. The CDRS, essentially an international 
organization committed to the conservation of the islands, provides scientific and 
technical advice for conservation and pest eradication. Its scientific and conservation 
mandate may sit uneasily alongside the interests and preoccupations of fishers. Hence, 
consensus in the PMB is difficult to achieve, particularly where the 'best outcome' 
doesn't necessarily tally with the interests of an individual group, or where local and 
national interests and solutions collide in the nationally dominated AIM. 
Fishers in particular have occasionally resorted to direct action in an effort to 
influence the AIM rather than rely on consensus decision-making. In this case 
promoting the objectives of the individual group, by any means, may take priority 
over wider social goals. This is even more of a risk in a relatively recently settled 
archipelago like the Galapagos, where social ties between socioeconomic groups are 
weaker than on islands with established communities, customs and social norms. In 
this respect, the Galapagos might be likened to a 'frontier society', with each social 
group only interested in securing its own claims on natural resources. These 
deficiencies in social capital can carry very serious consequences for island 
jurisdictions, and make their own contribution to failures in resourcefulness and 
consequently to lost opportunities. 
The same challenge confronts the island-Ecuador dynamic since the SLG works in 
some respects against the interest of some mainland stakeholders - for example by 
excluding mainland fishers and controlling immigration. As a result, the SLG is 
certainly not universally embraced by the entire Ecuadorian political establishment. 
Mainland fishing interests have, for example, lobbied government and argued against 
the extension of the GMR, together with the Ministries of Defence and the Navy. In 
this kind of contest between local and national actors, it is clear that the locals draw 
upon the international status of the Galapagos and of international networks to 
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counter national mainland interests and pressures that might otherwise prevail. 
Hence, these local-international actors and networks, building on Darwin's islands as 
the common intellectual property of humankind, cry out for protection, and have 
begun to establish a jurisdictional niche for natural resource protection of the islands 
and of their residents. In 1978, the Galapagos became one of the first locations to be 
conferred UN World Heritage status under the UN Convention Concerning the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972). This status was 
extended in 2001 to include the marine reserve. 
It is unlikely that the SLG, with its protections for the islands, would have existed 
had not the UN conferred World Heritage Status upon the Galapagos. After such a 
designation, any failure to protect the Galapagos would have received international 
condemnation. The SLG was passed in 1998 during a period of political and 
economic instability. Ecuador knew that it could ill afford to find itself out of favour 
with the world community, the UN, and such institutions as the World Bank. Hence, 
the SLG, though enacted into Ecuadorian domestic law, derives its real power from 
the sustained international interest in the Galapagos. The global status and appeal of 
the islands serve as anchor and leverage for local powers that would not have 
otherwise been devolved and granted by Ecuador. Moreover, without Darwin and the 
islands' global status, the islands would likely have remained a largely uninhabited, 
isolated, nature-rich archipelago just waiting to be consumed by the world's 
apparently insatiable appetite for sea food and resources. 
Tourism 
With this exalted status, the Galapagos could draw upon an assured niche in the 
international tourism market. Numbers of tourists, for example, increased threefold 
from 1985 to 1999. This achievement was assisted by improved communications, and 
heightened international awareness of the archipelago's ecological uniqueness, and 
growing interest in environment-based tourism. An important factor in this process 
has been a recent period of sustained economic growth, and the emergence of an 
increasingly wealthy and tourism-prone elite, in the US and Europe. In 1999, 66,000 
tourists visited the islands, 82% of whom were non-Ecuadorian (GNPS, 2003). 
Galapagos tourism is oriented around island-based cruise vessels. Tourists live 
on board, travelling from island to island. The activities of tourists are tightly 
controlled by officers of the GNPS, who accompany cruise vessels. 
A questionnaire survey of 448 tourists who visited the Galapagos between 
January and March 2001 suggests that the largest group of visitors comes from the 
USA (44%), followed by Europe (32%) (Kerr, 2002). US visitors tended to be older, 
with most in the 56-65 age group. US visitors spent significantly more on their 
holidays than non-US visitors. There are two other illuminating results. Firstly, the 
majority of visitors (93%) were on their first trip to the Galapagos. There is a very 
low level of returnees. Secondly, most visitors (60%) had previous experience of 
nature-based tourism. Respondents had already visited a variety of global 
destinations on nature-based holidays (such as Costa Rica, Namibia, Kenya and 
Antarctica). Based on expenditure evidence gathered by the survey, annual tourism 
expenditure was estimated to be in the region of US$71.5 million (excluding 
external travel costs). Over 90% of this expenditure was attributed to European 
and US visitors. 
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Fisheries 
The fishery in the Galapagos is split into three segments. There is the traditional 
fishery, open all year round, for fin-fish, which are dried, salted and sold to the 
Ecuadorian market. In 1999 this accounted for approximately 86 tonnes of dried fish 
with a value of US$0.3 million. The second component is a lobster fishery which grew 
rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s when refrigeration and air transport allowed the 
product to reach US markets. This is a dive fishery, with fishers typically using 
homemade surface supply equipment. Two or more divers will share a single air 
supply when underwater. In 1999, 55.4 tons of lobster was exported with an 
approximate value of US$1.0 million. This fishery is controlled by AIM and the 
GNPS with a quota, minimum landing size, and a four-month season. A permit is 
required to land and then export lobster. This makes illegal export difficult and 
provides the authorities with reliable catch data. The third and last segment is a dive 
fishery for sea cucumber (locally known as pepino). The pepino is processed before 
being exported to the Far East, where it is used as a medicine and a cosmetics 
ingredient. This is highly lucrative, with divers earning about US$l for each pepino. 
Once dried, pepino are easy to transport and smuggle illegally (unlike lobster, which 
must be refrigerated). Prior to 1999, pepino fishing was prohibited in the GMR; 
however, there was an extensive illegal fishery. In 1999 the fishery opened, with a 
two-month season. It is estimated that in excess of 4.5 million pepino can be 
harvested in a season, with a local value in excess of US$3 million (year 2000 values). 
The retail value in the Far East is in the region of US$6-9 million. 
The fishery sector in the Galapagos is artisanal, but not traditional. The ability to 
export product to external markets has allowed the sector to develop. Fishing 
incomes are determined by international markets in luxury fishery products (lobster 
and sea cucumber). Prices are maintained by demand from high-income economies 
(Singapore, Hong Kong and the USA) and a shortage of supply caused by 
unsustainable exploitation in other parts of the world (the Caribbean for lobster 
and the Far East for sea cucumber). 
External and internal threats 
It is widely recognized that the economIes of many SNIJs are dependent on 
international markets, and hence are vulnerable to changes in external market 
conditions. The Galapagos is no exception from other islands in this regard. Its main 
exports are luxury products and services (lobster, pepino and tourism), targeted at 
wealthy countries. One would expect these markets to exhibit strong income elasticity 
of demand. Any serious economic downturn in the USA, Europe or the Far East would 
have a major impact on these markets. Added to this, there are other external threats: 
• A change in international law in the trade of endangered species could have a 
major impact on pepino fisheries. 
• A change in fashion for ecotourism in the USA or EU, or competition from new 
fashionable alternatives to the Galapagos could affect tourism numbers. 
• Serious civil instability in mainland South America would have an impact on the 
number of US tourists (who are by nature reluctant international travellers, 
especially post-9!l1). 
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The Galapagos islanders can do little to influence the above exogenous variables. 
However, there are also internal threats to the islands' economy. These include: 
• over-fishing, causing a stock collapse; 
• an increase in tourist numbers, destroying the exclusive quality of the holiday 
expenence; 
• ecological disturbance from tourist numbers, introduced species, pollution, waste 
disposal and land enclosure. 
There is potential to address many of these issues at the level of the island itself using 
the vehicle of the SLG, though success will not necessarily come easily. Tourism can 
prove impervious to negative local feedback (McEachern and Towle, 1974; Carlsen, 
1999). Moreover, it is difficult to control tourist numbers when outside interests own 
the infrastructure. If an exclusive resort begins to lose its status and tourism 
expenditure starts to fall, then the obvious way to maintain incomes is to increase the 
number of lower-paying tourists, thereby adding pressure on the environment. 
Fishery resources are valuable. Many SNIJs do not have control over their waters. 
National governments may regard the lease of fishing rights to third countries as a 
useful source of income. Controlling migration may be seen as an infringement of civil 
liberties by those wishing to migrate to an island or recent immigrants who want their 
family to join them. 
In the Galapagos, the SLG provides autonomy to address many resource 
management issues. However, ensuring local control of resources requires consensus 
between the main socioeconomic groups. The development of the Galapagos has 
witnessed the emergence of three socioeconomic elites. There is a scientific/regulatory 
community with interests in the environment and conservation; a local fishing 
community; and a community of tourism operators and related interests. The 
scientific/regulatory community is global, well educated, and supported by a wider 
international network of conservation interests. The tourism community is politically 
well connected in Ecuador: after all, the Galapagos is the principal draw for tourists 
coming to Ecuador and an important source of foreign revenue. The fishing 
community is largely uneducated but it is unionized and prepared to take coordinated 
direct action to secure its goals. While the scientific/regulatory community was the 
main instigator of the process that led to the adoption of the SLG, each of the groups 
had a vested interest. Fishers saw the SLG as a way of excluding mainland boats from 
the lucrative fishery. Similarly, local tourist operators saw the SLG as a means of 
restricting new entrants, maintaining the natural environment, and raising the 
international cachet of the Galapagos. 
Thus, the SLG served the purposes of each of the islands' elites. While each group 
has an egoistic interest in protecting the islands' resources, the objectives of the three 
groups regularly conflict. Fishers are happy to see mainland boats excluded but make 
regular demands for increased lobster and pepino quota. These protests have 
occasionally become violent, and have included the tragic massacre of giant tortoises 
(Larson, 2001). Fishers are mistrustful of the motives of fishery scientists and 
conservationists, a pattern seen the world over (Kerr et al., 2006). Pepino and 
shark's fin are regularly taken illegally. In the Galapagos, it is the enforcement, rather 
than the creation, of laws that present the greatest challenge (Baldacchino, 2006, 
p.193). 
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It also remains to be seen what will happen if there is a fall in tourism income, and 
operators make demands to increase tourist numbers. Despite these problems, the 
SLG does provide the mechanism to find island-based solutions to issues of resource 
management, and the Gahipagos is without doubt in a better position than if the 
Special Law of 1998 had not been enacted. 
CASE STUDY 2: SAN ANDRES AND OLD PROVIDENCE 
Unlike the leverage provided by the undoubted iconic status of the Galapagos 
Islands on the international stage, fate has conferred no such strategic advantage 
upon the Colombian archipelago of San Andres and Old Providence (SAOP). This 
archipelago, with its current economy also built on fisheries and tourism and 
surrounded by one of the largest coral reefs in the world, received no Darwin and 
no high international profile. Instead, SAOP suffered the more customary fate of a 
Caribbean island in the European age of empire whose political economy was 
dictated by outside forces. It became a classic farm and plantation outpost, finding 
its economy and system of governance conforming to that model (Warrington and 
Milne, 2007). 
There are no definitive accounts of the 'discovery' of the islands. San Andres first 
appeared on Spanish maps in 1527. The archipelago of San Andres and Old 
Providence (SAOP), located in the western Caribbean Sea, approximately 770 km 
from the Colombian mainland and 240 km from Nicaragua, saw its first colonizers 
with the English Puritans who settled on the 18 km2 island of Old Providence in 
1629. There followed a train of subsequent colonizers from England, Spain, 
Argentina, Chile and France. The island of San Andres, with an area of around 27 
km2 , had by 1806 become a cotton plantation island, relying upon imported labour 
(Rosberg, 1975). 
San Andres has a spine of low hills, with a high point of 90 m. Natural vegetation is 
almost entirely absent, having been replaced by coconut plantations, farmland and 
urban development. This contrasts with Old Providence which has a rugged 
landscape reaching a height of 350 m. The low-lying land has been converted into 
farmland, while large parts of the interior remain covered by natural or semi-natural 
woodland. Two barrier reefs, with a series of atolls and smaller reefs, surround the 
island. The Old Providence reef is over 32 km long, the second largest in the 
Caribbean. The total marine area associated with the archipelago is approximately 
300,000 km2, representing nearly 10% of the Caribbean Sea (Coralina, 2000). 
In 1822 the conference at Villa del Santa Rosa brought the islands officially under 
the control of the mainland and they have remained Colombian ever since. However, 
the English-speaking, Protestant islanders remained culturally distinct from mainland 
Colombia, and were essentially left as self-governing communities until well into the 
twentieth century. 
The Baptist faith was brought to the islands in 1847. It has remained the religion 
most closely associated with the native islanders. The abolition of slavery in 1853 led 
to the introduction of sharecropping and a change in the main export crop to 
coconut. Fishing and crops supplemented incomes and diet. Exports of coconut oil to 
the USA began in 1855 and this remained the chief export for more than a hundred 
years. The 1930s, however, saw a major downturn in the fortunes of the coconut 
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industry, with cheap alternatives to coconut oil, and recession in the USA depressed 
demand. Added to this, the plantations on the island were decimated by coconut 
blight. The predominantly black, English-speaking, Baptist population languishing 
upon this isolated and declining outpost of European empire shared strong cultural 
similarities with other Caribbean islands (e.g. the West Indies, Cayman and Jamaica) 
but relatively few cultural and economic similarities with the Latin parent state of 
Colombia to which they were tied. Such was the cruel and contrasting fate of this 
archipelago. 
Free-port status 
After the Second World War, following the cessation of the Colombian civil war (La 
Violencia), and partly in response to representations by islanders, the national 
government took a closer interest in SAOP. In 1953, San Andres was declared a free-
port. This marked the start of a period of radical socioeconomic change. 
Free-port status might at first be thought to have been intended to encourage 
entrepat trade and to set the islands upon a different and self-reliant foundation of 
political economy. The trade aspects of the San Andres free-port, however, failed to 
materialize (and may never have figured genuinely in the government's intentions). In 
retrospect, it appears that the free-port designation of San Andres was driven more by 
the internal economic and political interests on the mainland, providing as it did an 
outlet for wealthy Colombians to go on holiday and to buy luxury goods unavailable 
on the mainland, while generating tax revenue for the central government. This 
'Colombianizing' of the Caribbean islands promoted angry nationalism in the wake 
of La Violencia. 
The free-port allowed 'commercial tourism' to flourish. Mainland Colombians 
visited the island to purchase electrical goods, jewellery, watches, tobacco, perfume 
and exclusive alcoholic drinks. To take advantage of the free-port status, visitors were 
required to spend at least four nights on the island. This stimulated the development 
of shops, hotels, restaurants and night clubs. The emerging infrastructure helped 
stimulate further demand. In San Andres, tourism became the mainstay of the 
economy, while Old Providence remained largely dependent on agriculture and 
fishing. The development of the free-port also led to an influx of migrants from 
mainland Colombia. 
The demography of the islands, in terms of numbers and ethnic origin, underwent 
significant transformation over the latter half of the twentieth century. The 
population of San Andres was just over 14,000 in 1964. The population rose rapidly 
as the free-port developed, mostly fuelled by migration of Hispanic Colombians from 
the mainland. Migrant Colombians arrived to take advantage of the opportunities 
presented by the free-port. During this time, incentives were given to mainlanders to 
settle on the islands. These included free passage, parcels of land, commercial 
licences, guaranteed jobs and business and home loans at low interest rates. In 
addition to mainland Colombians, small numbers of other nationals (mainly 
Lebanese and Syrians) settled on the islands and their descendants still play an 
important role in the island's retail sector. 
The exact size of the population is a politically sensitive subject and difficult to 
establish. Even official estimates vary widely. Official data published in 2003 
suggested that the population of San Andres comprises approximately 73,000 (Mow 
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et at., 2007) even though the latest census data, that exclude illegal migrants, suggest 
that the population in 2005 was 55,426 (DANE, 2007). 
Under the 1991 Constitution (Article 310), immigrants are required to hold 
residency cards, and illegal immigrants deliberately avoid the census. Illegal residents 
may number over 30,000, with no less than 33 shanty areas in San Andres (Coralina, 
2001). Continuing illegal immigration may be due partly to economic and partly to 
security concerns on the mainland. Population growth on Old Providence has been 
less dramatic with 2,318 inhabitants in 1964, up to 4,147 in 2005 (DANE, 2007). 
Population growth has been, and continues to be, a key issue for the sustainable 
development of the islands and the cultural survival of its native community. 
Population growth results in various impacts, including: 
• pressure on freshwater resources (such as increased demands on supply, and 
contamination from sewage); 
• potential for disease and loss of environmental quality from poor sanitation, high 
volumes of waste production and inadequate waste disposal; 
• over-exploitation of terrestrial and marine resources, leading to degradation of 
ecosystems, destruction of biodiversity, increasing poverty and loss of food 
security; 
• continual pressure on land resources for urban development; 
• loss of cultural identity of native islanders; 
• ethnic tensions from inequity where specific groups dominate or are perceived to 
be unfairly economically advantaged; 
• economic strain on local public service providers and infrastructure; 
• urban development, shanty towns and sanitation problems, undermining the 
factors that make the islands an attractive tourist destination. 
The rise in population has created tensions between different ethnic and social 
groups. On the one hand, native islanders - the Raizales - feel that over many years 
their culture and traditional rights have been taken over by Latin immigrants. On the 
other, tension also arises between established Latin residents and the new 
impoverished immigrants fleeing to the island in order to escape poverty and 
insecurity on the mainland (Mow et at., 2007). 
Prior to the 1950s, the islands were largely self-governing. This arose from a lack of 
interest on the part of mainland Colombia, then ravaged by civil war, rather than 
because of any expression of independence by the islanders. The islands were simply 
left to themselves and islanders got on with the business of survival. Both economic 
and cultural life on the island with its distinct black, English-speaking, Protestant 
Creole culture was largely separate from that of Colombia. 
When mainland Colombia started to exert increasing control over all economic, 
social and cultural aspects of life in the 1950s, following civil war in Colombia, 
national politicians wanted to create a single unified state with one culture, one 
religion and one language. Consequently, the Creole culture and particularly the 
English language were suppressed. Catholicism was vigorously promoted on the 
islands. Public schools became Catholic and all Protestant schools were closed. 
Islanders had to convert to Catholicism to hold any public-sector jobs. In the late 
1950s, Spanish was enforced as the language of the archipelago. Spanish-speaking 
teachers, predominantly Spanish monks and nuns, were unable to communicate 
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effectively with the English-speaking native students, who were forbidden to speak 
English on school grounds. As a result, many children from that generation became 
illiterate in their native English language and also failed to develop adequate language 
skills in Spanish, the only legally recognized language in Colombia until 1991. All 
official business and legal transactions were conducted in Spanish. Thus, it was 
practically impossible for the native islanders to hold positions of authority or 
responsibility in business or public life. 
Overview of economic activity 
The establishment of the free-port in 1953 transformed the socioeconomy of San 
Andres from one dependent on agriculture and fishing to one driven by tourism and 
commerce. In 1953, there were only four major commercial enterprises and 
some small home-based shops, and no hotels or restaurants. By 1962, there were 
276 shops and 31 hotels (Toro, 1963). By 1997, the number of shops on the 
island had expanded to 2,077, with over 200 hotels, restaurants and bars catering 
for tourists (Diaz, 2000). Most of this development took place in the 1970s and 
1980s. 
The free-port created a sea-change in the socioeconomy of San Andres. For almost 
a century prior to 1953, the economy had been based on the export of coconut oil, 
with incomes supplemented by agricultural fishing. The opportunities created by the 
free-port were in international trade, commerce and tourism. In the absence of any 
positive discrimination and training, there were few real prospects for islanders taking 
a leading role in this development. The disadvantaged position of islanders was 
compounded by discriminatory economic incentives, prejudice against non-Spanish 
speakers and racism. 
Tourism in San Andres 
San Andres currently attracts in excess of 350,000 tourists every year. However, there 
are few similarities between tourism in San Andres and in most other Caribbean 
islands. Significantly, there are very few foreign tourists in San Andres. In 1999, less 
that 5% of tourists were non-Colombian (Diaz et al., 2000). A questionnaire survey 
of 240 tourists on the island of San Andres in June-July 2000 and December-
February 2000-1 revealed that over 60% of these Colombian visitors come from 
three mainland cities: Cali (27%), Bogota (25%), and Medellin (19%) (Kerr, 2002). 
San Andres is essentially a domestic tourist resort for the mainland state. This 
contrasts with tourism in most Caribbean islands, which is heavily geared towards 
North American and European visitors. For Colombians, San Andres fulfils fairly 
conventional holiday needs. The main reason for visiting the islands is sun and sand 
(the Caribbean natural environment), and 76% of visitors stay with family or friends. 
San Andres attracts repeat visits - 68% of Colombian visitors had visited before 
(many several times), and 95% said they would consider returning again. The small 
number of international tourists surveyed (30) indicated that value for money was the 
main attraction. San Andres provides a small number of foreign visitors with an 
inexpensive Caribbean holiday. 
The nature of tourism in San Andres has changed significantly over the years. The 
initial model was 'commercial tourism' with wealthy Colombians visiting the islands 
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to purchase luxury goods. Shopping is now a low priority for Colombian visitors and 
not a priority for foreign visitors. The tourist infrastructure grew in the 1970s and 
1980s based on relatively small numbers of high-spending tourists. However, since 
the Colombian economy was liberalized, there is now no need for Colombians to 
travel to purchase goods, and other holiday destinations are available to wealthy 
Colombians. San Andres now attracts middle-income Colombian families. As the 
'exclusivity' of the resort has waned, the numbers of tourists have increased. High 
tourist numbers and over-population result in serious waste management problems. 
Raw sewage seeps into the sea, ground water is being polluted and there is a serious 
solid-waste disposal problem. When asked about problems on the island, both 
Colombians and non-Colombians repeatedly raised litter, sanitation, sewage and lack 
of toilets as significant problems. 
There is a desperate need for investment in sewage and waste management 
facilities. The tourism industry on the island would like to attract higher-spending 
tourists and compete with other Caribbean destinations. However, poor infrastruc-
ture makes this difficult. Furthermore, overseas visitors, in particular North American 
visitors, are discouraged from visiting the island because of the poor security situation 
in Colombia. The islands are safe, but all connecting flights to San Andres are via the 
Colombian mainland. 
Fisheries 
The fish and shellfish resources of the San Andres archipelago are exploited by three 
groups of fishers: artisanal fishers on both Old Providence and San Andres; legal 
industrial fishing, landing catch in both San Andres and directly to the mainland; and 
illegal industrial fishing. The National Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture (INPA) 
sets the quota for both artisanal and industrial fishers. The quota is heavily skewed 
towards the industrial fishery. In 2000, the industrial fishery received a quota of 197 
tons, while artisanal fishers were awarded a quota of 3 tons (weight of lobster tail). It 
is widely accepted that this quota is exceeded by all fishers, with additional catches by 
illegal boats landing lobster in Central America. 
Artisanal fishers tend to fish from launches which are generally 3-4 m long. They 
exploit a combination of fin-fish, lobster and conch. Lobster forms a greater 
proportion of the catch in Old Providence than in San Andres. Fin-fish are generally 
caught using hand lines. Conch and lobster are gathered by free-diving without the 
aid of surface demand or scuba equipment. Free-diving limits the sea area available 
for exploitation by artisanal fishers. The artisanal fishers are almost exclusively native 
islanders (raizales). The fin-fish catch is sold locally. Lobster and conch are sold to 
local restaurants or to dealers. Lobster is exported to the USA (Miami or New York) 
via mainland Colombia. Fishing is particularly important on Old Providence, with 
25% of households on the island reliant on fishing. 
The industrial fishery exploits resources throughout the archipelago. It focuses on 
lobster, and to a lesser extent conch, using both traps and divers. Many industrial 
vessels are foreign-registered, obtaining fishing permits directly from Colombian 
authorities in Bogota. Vessels may carry in excess of 20 divers, a large proportion of 
whom are native Central American. Twenty divers per boat is the legal limit set by 
INPA. However, there are regular reports of numbers in excess of this. An onboard 
compressor will supply air to several divers via a single pipe. As many as 600 people 
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may be involved in this fishery. Industrial and artisanal fishers exploit the same stock 
and are therefore in competition. 
A small number of boats land catch at a fish factory in San Andres, but most of the 
catch is landed directly to the mainland before being exported to the US. Few, if any, 
islanders work on industrial vessels. The fish processing plant provides part-time 
employment for 25-30 people. Other minor benefits include the provision of services 
and supplies to the vessels themselves. 
Autonomy: acquired by default, lost by design? 
Prior to 1954, the islands of SAOP enjoyed significant autonomy. This was not a 
result of bilateral arrangements or protective legislation. Autonomy was essentially by 
default and purely a function of a lack of interest on the part of a parent state in the 
throes of civil war. A native population with a different language, religion, ethnic 
background and culture from that of mainland Colombia increased this sense of 
independence. The islands forged trade links with North America, resources were 
locally owned and controlled, and incomes were supplemented by small-scale 
agriculture and fisheries (Mow et aI., 2007). Yet it is dangerous to romanticize the 
past, for, like many other island economies, the economic situation in SAOP was 
precarious. The post-war collapse in the market for coconut oil, plus a coconut blight, 
brought real poverty to the islands. Initially, many islanders welcomed the increased 
Colombian involvement and investment that took place in the 1950s. 
Post-1954, there was a dramatic loss of autonomy. Cultural autonomy was 
undermined with the imposition of Catholicism, and the use of Spanish in schools and 
official transactions. Economic autonomy was lost as outside interests bought 
property and controlled commercial activity. Political autonomy was lost as 
Colombians dominated the islands' administration. Control over marine resources 
was lost as the mainland administration limited the activities of artisanal fishers and 
leased lucrative fishing rights to outside industrial vessels. 
The process of Colombianization created a new political class on the islands of 
SOAP. Mainland Colombians controlled all significant commercial activity and all 
positions of power in the islands' administration. These new groups were subservient 
to mainland interests and had neither cultural connection with nor empathy for the 
native population. The interests of this new business and political elite were best 
served by close links with the mainland and not by island autonomy. At first, many 
islanders welcomed development. Able to sell land to developers and find employ-
ment, many islanders felt increasingly wealthy. For a time, increasing incomes 
obscured the reality that only a fraction of the wealth generated on the island trickled 
down to islanders. 
Fifty years later, San Andres is now possibly the most densely populated island in 
the Caribbean, with significant environmental, housing, sanitation, and waste 
management problems. There is a crumbling tourist infrastructure unable to compete 
with other Caribbean islands. An industrial fishery exploits lucrative marine 
resources, with no significant economic benefit to the islands themselves. 
Colombia is, however, not impervious to change. In 1991, it introduced a radical 
new constitution. The new constitution obliged the state to protect the diversity and 
integrity of the environment, recognize the right of people to participate in decision-
making, and recognize all ethnic groups and their languages. The new constitution 
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created 34 regional autonomous corporations (CARs) responsible for managing 
natural resources. Special rights were given to SAOP, allowing the introduction of 
population control measures. The CAR for SAOP is known as Coralina. In 2000, the 
archipelago was recognized as a UN Biosphere Reserve and the Seaflower Marine 
Protected Area was designated by national decree in 2005. Coralina has taken 
considerable steps towards developing a management regime for the reserve which 
involves all stakeholders. Encouragingly, a consensus has emerged across all the 
islands' ethnic groups concerning the need to protect the environment and marine 
resources. 
The success of these measures will, to a large extent, be dependent on national 
institutions recognizing the legitimacy of this process. This requires a major 
psychological shift on their part. So far, national agencies have been reluctant to 
recognize local institutions and have not been prepared to share decision-making with 
islanders, particularly on the issue of fisheries management. Population control is an 
important issue but very difficult to address. While migration controls may prevent 
more refugees from mainland Colombia entering the islands, they cannot easily 
address the existing chronic over-population. Any positive measures to reduce 
population will be difficult and politically sensitive. 
CONCLUSION 
In some respects, SAOP and the Galapagos Islands were both 'discovered' by their 
parent states after years of neglect. The Galapagos were once considered to be little 
more than an inhospitable volcanic outcrop, with high ecological but low economic 
value. The advent of cheaper air travel and high-value nature tourism has 
transformed the islands into the wealthiest department in Ecuador. With this wealth 
came population growth, over-exploitation of marine resources, and the introduction 
of alien species. However, UN World Heritage Status, a high global profile, and an 
international climate supportive of subsidiarity have allowed the Galapagos Islands to 
gain considerable control over their internal resources. 
The story in contemporary SAOP is very different. This archipelago went from 
benign neglect prior to the 1950s to repression and thorough consolidation with the 
Colombian mainland in political, cultural, and economic terms. Consequently all 
aspects of the islands' administration and resource management have been brought 
under central state control. The economy saw a rapid expansion and then decline of the 
tourism sector, with chronic over-population, severe environmental health problems, 
resource degradation, and the marginalization of native islanders and their culture. 
While a new constitution provides a glimmer of hope for an element of autonomy to 
SAOP and for international environmental protection under a UN Biosphere Reserve, 
successful resistance to a national administration with a strong political culture of 
centralized control is unlikely. SAOP's system of governance so far conforms to that of 
a classic fief, having never successfully managed the transition from dependence upon 
an earlier plantation economy, and hence found itself almost wholly subject to alien 
and outside control and manipulation (Warrington and Milne, 2007). 
The lessons here are clear. The level of autonomy that SNIJs can aspire to is, often 
and to a large extent, determined by factors external to the island jurisdiction. The 
modern development of the Galapagos occurred within the context of a wider process 
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of globalization, which has clearly facilitated the development of SNI] status. At the 
start of the twenty-first century, with an increasingly globalized economy, the 
political zeitgeist is very much in favour of sub-national arrangements. Furthermore, 
the process of globalization has itself enhanced the international status of the 
Galapagos. Darwin's contributions to science are now widely accepted and have 
fundamentally changed how humanity perceives itself and its relationship with the 
natural world. As the status of Darwin increased, so did the profile of the Galapagos 
rise. Yet it is important to note that the political resource now enjoyed by the 
Galapagos is purely a function of chance. If Darwin had taken his father's advice and 
not accepted his position on the HMS Beagle, then the Galapagos would possibly be 
no more than a disadvantaged volcanic outcrop with its considerable marine 
resources being over-exploited by outside interests. 
The development of San Andres, on the other hand, happened at a time when the 
interests of the parent state demanded tighter control and this resulted in a dramatic 
loss of island autonomy. In the 1950s, there was international support for a small 
number of former Caribbean island colonies in their quest for independence. 
However, beyond this decolonization, there was little interest in autonomy for 
regions, or islands, within national states. Consequently, the anonymous SAOP 
archipelago enjoyed no external defence against the penetration of mainland interests, 
resulting in the complete loss of control over its own resources. Some external 
recognition has belatedly come in the form of a Biosphere designation. However, 
without the kind of celebrity status enjoyed by the Galapagos, resistance to 
Colombian authorities and to industrial fishing interests that threaten the Seaflower 
Biosphere Reserve brings no chorus of international condemnation. By contrast, the 
response by the international media to the recent minor Jessica oil spill in the 
Galapagos shows how uneven are the stakes between these two archipelagos. 
With external factors so much a matter of chance, and with relative comparative 
advantages so temporary, the onus falls upon islanders to seize opportunities while they 
are still available. Yet even here, the role of internal factors cannot be overlooked, and 
history may not have dealt islands an equally benign legacy. SNI] arrangements can 
only be developed if local elites and communities can function effectively and 
consensually in response to local needs. When development came to San Andres in the 
1950s, a new ruling economic and political class was effectively transplanted from the 
mainland. This group was strongly subservient to mainland interests and had no 
interest in developing local jurisdictional autonomy. By contrast, in the Galapagos, 
each of the key island groups had a vested interest in enhancing SNI] status: principally, 
to exclude outside interests from gaining access to the island resources. 
There are other lessons here. In addition to the requirement of a united local elite, 
intent on maximizing its SNI] status, there must also be sufficient political and fiscal 
clout to manage this process. In the Galapagos, while each group saw an advantage in 
the development of SNI] status, they have had difficulties in reaching agreement on 
the internal allocation of resources and on building stakeholder consensus. As a 
result, conflict remains endemic and the island remains weakened in its capacity to 
manage change in external circumstances. If, for example, the current 'fashion' for 
nature tourism amongst wealthy Europeans and Americans comes to an end, what 
will be the response in the Galapagos? Any fall in tourism incomes would inevitably 
lead to calls for increased numbers and a move towards a mass tourism model with 
increased numbers and increased environmental pressure. 
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The Galapagos and San Andres were once backwaters, but are now exposed to the 
full force of economic development. In 1954, San Andres was declared a free-port and 
the development that followed took place exclusively on that island. The island of 
Old Providence remains largely undeveloped. While San Andres' population increased 
1,600%, the population of Old Providence has barely doubled. On Old Providence 
the majority of the population is native and the local culture is vibrant. Most families 
rely on agriculture, and fishing. The island is covered by semi-natural forest, fringed 
by white beaches and palm trees, and surrounded by one of the largest coral reefs in 
the world. Old Providence is to western eyes the very epitome of the Caribbean island 
ideal. While San Andres developed, the world ignored Old Providence. The 
Caribbean tourism boom has avoided Old Providence. 
Conscious of what has happened on its sister island of San Andres, Old Providence 
is wary of major tourism development and losing control to outside interests. It might 
be thought that perhaps Old Providence now has the chance to develop its potential 
without the environmental destruction, exploitation and cultural subjugation suffered 
by San Andres; yet, without its own strong political resources and institutions, that 
outcome remains unlikely. Neither Old Providence nor San Andres is as yet a fully 
fledged or genuine SNI], nor has either of the two been permitted to become so by 
their mainland masters. Unlike the Galapagos Islands, this Caribbean archipelago 
cannot muster sufficient leverage to win much beyond the barest rudiments of local 
institutions and jurisdiction. Without these, there can be no real protection from 
outside interests nor effective environmental management. 
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